Ethnic Conflict

There is a modern tendency to refer to wars as ethnically or culturally based.  But what is ethnicity really? Is everyone in one group of the same thinking? Ethnicity is fluid, changing and constantly evolving, not something that is static. Ethnicity or culture is something that is self-identified, and has been known to change over a life time. When it comes to conflict, this ethnic label allows for no real political solution to end the war. It is seen as something that must be worked out between the ethnicities, an ancient hatred that is not easily resolved; but what is the reality of this? In most cases where “ethnic” war has been declared, different ethnicities lived side by side in the cities for generations or millennia with little problem. They may have even had high intermarriage and mixing rates in some areas.

I have heard stories from my older Lebanese friends of Jew, Christian, Muslim and Druze all living within one city’s walls as neighbours, sharing and intermixing before the wars (at least to some degree) and how this changed once the wars began. The census statistics would seem to back part of this up.

I have watched documentaries like “We are all neighbours” by anthropologist Tone Bringa (I urge you to watch this!), a sad realization of the situation in the former Yugoslav nations. This movie traces the friendships between the ethnic communities before the war started, and follows the progression as the violence intensifies. It shows once loving neighbours turn against each other in rapid progression in the wake of hostility and propaganda. It shows elderly neighbours, life-long best friends of fighting ethnic backgrounds who turn against each other as fear takes hold. It is heartbreaking to watch, but this type of progression is found in most of the so-called “ethnic” conflicts.

These conflicts are not ethnic; this is merely the manifestation and progression of how the conflicts are shaping themselves. It is not about religion or culture or ethnic background. It is more about inequity within the systems combined with intensive war-time propaganda and political policies that shift the blame for this inequity onto specific ethnic groups or citizenship regimes that reward one population over another. Propaganda gets spread to the populations to engrain this into their heads and becomes the new “truth”. Textbooks and other educational materials made by the governments may even back it up.

A glaring example of these political realities and ethnic labeling can be found in the DR Congo.

As many as 200 ethnic groups live within the borders of the DRC. Divisions in Congolese society, however, run deeper than ethnic heritage, with separations also running along language, class, political, cultural and citizenship lines. Ethnic, cultural or language groups are often allied with other groups, political parties, governments and organizations, blurring the exact lines between warring parties. The continuing conflict in the DRC has often been referred to as “ethnic”, despite the fluidity of ethnicities and the fact that ethnic segregation is something most ordinary Congolese resist, having lived in multi-ethnic communities for generations. Ethnicities in the DRC are incredibly overlapping and heavily inter-mixed by marriage, and continue to be inter-mixed despite the war.

In the DR Congo, colonialization is still playing its role in inequitable systems. Belgian colonial powers attempted to separate the Lendu peoples (a cultural group) from the Hema peoples, giving them strict administrative boundaries (although they had lived together intermixing for generations before this). The Belgians regarded the Hema as a superior race, and gave them privileged access to education, land, administration and commerce. They decided who was in which cultural group rather arbitrarily, sometimes based solely on outward physical features. From the 1930s to the 1950s the Belgian administrators started to deliberately transplant Hutus and Tutsis from Rwanda into the Congo to help and alleviate the demographic pressure in famine-prone parts of Rwanda and to meet growing labor demands in colonial plantations and mines in the Congo. These people, commonly referred to as Rwandophones often stayed on in the DRC and had families here.

At Independence, it was decided by Constitutional decree that only one Congolese nationality existed and only those ethnic groups (not individuals) who were declared as occupying the territory prior to 1908 were granted this privilege. Many Rwandophones whose families had been residing in the Congo since the start of colonialization, were denied citizenship rights on this basis. The citizenship decree was annulled in 1981, and the occupying date was pushed back to 1855, still excluding many. 

In 1973, authoritarian ruler Mobutu Sese Seko began his zaireanization process in an attempt to reverse the colonial policies. Post-colonial reorganization attempts to incorporate another ethnic group (the Ngiti) resulted in depriving them of access to Lake Albert (the main water source) and created ethnic tensions which can still be felt today.

Mobutu also began transferring ownership of ex-colonial plantations in Ituri (in the North of the country) over to elite Hema individuals. He manipulated ethnic divisions over identity and land ownership to reward his political followers. His General Property Law of 1973 allowed land to be privatized (including ancestral land), and sped up the process where Hema cattle herders could displace Lendu agriculturalists. The elite Hema, who dominated local governance, passed this law because it was beneficial to them.

Much of the population wrongly believed they could still inherit ancestral land, but this new law allowed land to be sold privately, without the occupier’s notice. The Law stipulated that occupiers should be given a two year grace period to leave their land, which was subsequently ignored by the Ugandan troops (assisting the Congolese government) in the area who instantaneously evicted mostly Lendu from their lands.

Another deal between Mobutu and Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana allowed one ethnic group (the Banyarwanda) to take over territories in North Kivu. Local chiefs and non-Banyarwanda, fearing encroachment by these land expropriations began forming local militias to protect themselves. Between 6,000 and 10,000 people were killed and more than 250,000 were displaced in clashes in this one area over land in 1993 alone.

A fragile peace was achieved soon after, but was subsequently destroyed when more than one million Hutu refugees (including members of the interahamwe militia responsible for the Rwandan genocide) fleeing the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) settled in the DRC in 1994-5. Many of the refugees were heavily armed and with the help of local Congolese Hutu and propaganda, transferred the conflict and began killing the Congolese Tutsi. The Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Zaire headed by Laurent Kabila, scattered the interahamwe militia throughout the DRC (then named Zaire) and captured Kinshasa in 1997, overthrowing Mobutu from his 32 year rule. Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, angered that they did not receive remuneration expected for helping to topple Mobutu, stayed in the country and began extensively plundering its wealth. In response, Kabila’s new government began arming the interahamwe and other local militias (especially the Mai Mai) in an attempt to drive these foreigners out. Rwanda responded by attacking the largest towns in the Kivus through proxy armies such as the Rassamblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RDC).

This type of political and citizenship manipulation is separating ethnic groups and creating hatreds among them, and is still happening in the DRC to this day. In fact, the examples go on and on.  It is happening also all over the world, in many other countries. The next time you hear a story about ancient ethnic hatreds, think twice and do some digging. You may just find there is much more to the conflict than meets the eye. 

 

 

The “ethnic” side of conflict in the Caucaus.

 

This summer brought to light complicated global hostilities and the probability of continued conflict in the Caucasus region. Russia has sent a clear message to the West, who has been trying to lure away countries on Russia’s western border and turn them democratic and market-oriented, that it will not tolerate excessive signs of independence from its neighbours.

 

For many months preceding the war, Russia imposed heavy sanctions on Georgia and rounded up Georgians in Moscow for deportation. In revenge for Kosovo’s independence, Prime Minister Putin established legal ties with the governments of South Ossetia and Abkhazia on Georgia’s northern borders, two regions who have broken away from the Georgian territory. In early July, Russia staged a massive military exercise on the border with South Ossetia, and many Russian jets flew over the region, increasing tensions. In August, Georgia and South Ossetian separatists exchanged fire and explosive attacks. Expected peace talks were halted, after the Russia diplomat in charge of facilitating the process blew off the meetings. Russia then claimed that Georgia broke the unilateral ceasefire by ordering a massive “ethnic cleansing” offensive in South Ossetian villages. According to Georgia, the ceasefire was broken by the South Ossetians. Georgia then began to shell and invade South Ossetia, leaving the Russian army (who was conveniently nearby after its military exercises) to move in to “protect” the South Ossetians.

 

Blood is clearly on all hands. Civilians are caught in the cross-fire. Thousands have been displaced, hundreds have died, and although a ceasefire has been signed, peace is far from a reality.

 

The region has been struggling to rebuild itself for the past twenty years. Nationalism flourished after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and began dividing the region ethnically and ideologically. Factions that lived in relative peace for centuries, were suddenly ideological enemies, and displaced to their new ethnically fixed territorial regions. Conflicting histories plague the peace process as claims to land are ‘legitimized’ by different regional versions. Massive ethnic cleansing of regions (including forced displacement and relocation) has left pockets of clashing ethnicities eager to slit each others’ throats.

 

The tendency since the Cold War to describe all conflicts as “ethnic” conflicts has left many wondering if these are in fact “ethnic” conflicts at all. If the tensions are a product of ancient ethnic hatreds, then this would assume that there is something inherently conflictual about ethnicity, making conflict increasingly inevitable since we live in such an ethnically diverse world. We often forget that ethnicities are not some homogenous group, but are in fact constantly changing and fluid. The problems have more to do with access to raw materials and political choices that have pitted one group against another.

Separating ethnicities into homogenous enclaves is a dangerous game.

 

Academics claim that the more ethnically diverse a society, the less its propensity towards conflict. In fact the chance for conflict increases the more ethnically singular an area is, especially if the society is ranked. Ethnicities need to be recognized and the rights of all peoples, regardless of religion, ethnicity, race, background, etc. need to be enforced.

 

Violent conflict is always avoidable. There are many ways to transform conflict through non-violent means. Diplomacy must begin to work, and to do this we must demand it work. Our governments must sanction aggressors to the full extent, and ensure that the do not get away with violence. We must write letters, stage protests, and make our voices heard. Violence has no need to continue, but the only way it will ever stop is if we make it stop through international sanctioning, pressures and peace building initiatives. We can transform war into peace, but only through intense solidified effort. We must all work together.